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Climate change raises specific and unprecedented challenges for large investments in
infrastructure. Transport, water and sewage, and energy networks are sectors typi-
cally characterized by significant sunk investments and technological choices that are
locked in over several decades. Over such periods, changing weather conditions are
expected, albeit unpredictable. Certainly, the deep current scientific uncertainty re-
garding future climate conditions, potentially coupled with an increasing likelihood of
very large catastrophic events, makes long-term decisions in such sectors quite a chal-
lenge for practitioners.1 Climate change might have significant implications for future
investments and maintenance of existing assets in key sectors, which in turn might
affect upfront investments both in size and quality.
Since they involve long term contracts, often covering twenty or thirty years, the so-
called Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are particularly sensitive to climate change
hazards. Over recent years, a number of countries, including the US as well as several
European and emerging countries, have increasingly relied on PPPs to respond to their
investments needs in sectors involving Long-Lived Capital Stock (LLKS).2 Because it
entails delegation to the private sector of key decisions over both the structure of initial
investments and the subsequent management of assets over a long period, this con-
tracting mode has also been viewed as an attractive response to important shortages
in public funds. Beyond this public finance motivation, the efficiency gains of PPPs
have also been repeatedly emphasized in contexts where relationships between public
bodies and the private sector are plagued with agency costs, contract incompletenesses
and transaction costs as pointed out by a burgeoning literature.3
Equipped with a model of long-term contracting tailored to the specificities that
climate change brings to the agency relationship between public bodies and firms, this
paper aims at analyzing the suitability of the standard PPP model in coping efficiently
with climate change-related uncertainty. In a nutshell, we argue that long-term con-
tracting is plagued with new agency costs of delegated flexibility that may be better
controlled when parties wait until uncertainty on climate conditions is resolved to
draft new arrangements. This offers thus a rather pessimistic view on the benefit of
PPPs in that context.
1Weitzman (2009) and Hallegate (2009).
2See for instance, the exhaustive evidence and discussion in Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2008) and
Estache and Iimi (2011), and the statistics reported by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2011) on the growing
importance of PPPs in Europe and in the U.S., with a fivefold increase between 1998-2007 and 2008-2010.
3Benz, Grout and Hallonen (2001), Bennet and Iossa (2006), Hart (2003), Iossa and Martimort (2008),
Martimort and Pouyet (2008), Engel, Fisher and Galetovic (2010), among many others.
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Climate change and infrastructure investment. The current process of anthropogenic
climate change will dramatically affect the environment in which long-term economic
decisions are made. What makes this process peculiar is the large and growing uncer-
tainty on future values of environmental parameters. Indeed, global scenarios about
climate change include relatively large confidence intervals (IPCC, 2007). This makes
it difficult to pinpoint more than broad probability distributions for future outcomes,
and to rule out disastrous collapses.
Some evidence exists of a link between anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG)
concentration and local extreme events, such as heat waves, floodings and precipi-
tations.4 However, uncovering the exact channels and providing precise future pro-
jections appear to be beyond current scientific possibilities.5 As a result, climate risk
assessments for specific businesses such as utilities are severely limited by the coarse
spatial resolution of climate models and the ensuing lack of clear understanding of
how global climate change translates at the local level (IFC, 2010).
Climate change related hazards are especially relevant for infrastructure on several
fronts. First, the accelerating rate of climate change implies that long-lived investments
will have to cope, during their lifetime, with a broader range of climatic conditions.
Power plants typically last for at least 30 to 40 years; energy distribution networks and
water and transportation infrastructures are built to last for periods of time in between
30 and 100 years.6 Such assets are thus likely to experience large variations in average
temperature conditions, precipitations, etc., over their life cycle. This is particularly
true for developing countries, where there are both large scale needs for infrastructure
investment and it is widely expected that the impact of climate change will be stronger
(World Development Report, 2010).
Second, the very nature of infrastructure investments implies a crucial sensitivity
to climate hazards. Water collection and distribution networks, as well as hydroelec-
tric power plants,7 are dependent on precipitations, rivers and glacial runoffs, drought
and floods. Significant changes along these dimensions would imply major impacts
on the availability of water for human consumption and irrigation and significant
needs for adaptation of water management networks to deal with risks of scarcity and
contamination among others.8 Similarly, physical infrastructures, such as roads and
4See Stott, Stone and Allen (2004), Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), Pall et al. (2011), and Min,
Zhang, Zwiers and Hegerl (2011).
5Stone and Allen (2005). Piao et al. (2010).
6Shalizi and Lecocq (2009), Hallegate (2009).
7See the case of the Brazilian Belo Monte dam, world’s third largest projected dam.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/brazil/110203/drought-belo-monte-dam, last consulted Feb.,
23rd, 2011.
8Piao et al. (2010); The Center for Health and the Global Environment (2005).
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bridges, are critically sensitive to extreme temperatures: More intense heat waves will
increase deterioration of traditional asphalt roads, while those in low-lying areas will
require additional investments to be protected against floods. Energy plants and dis-
tribution networks efficiency is also affected by extreme temperatures, precisely when
these conditions also generate demand peaks. For example, increasing reliance on
nuclear power would imply greater needs and more difficulties to rely on water for
cooling.9 Additionally, the process of rapid urbanization, especially in the develop-
ing world, leads to an ever greater concentration of investments and services, making
equipments and networks even more sensitive to stress on environmental resources
and to localized extreme events such as storms or floods.
Finally, the mounting pressures to introduce innovative technologies that mitigate
the impact of infrastructure on climate change10 are also likely to significantly increase
costs. For example, for the first time in mankind’s history, the current change in energy
technological mix away from fossil fuels implies a shift towards less efficient energy
sources.11 Indeed, leading renewables are characterized among others by lower energy
density and greater intermittency, translating into higher costs. Similarly, water man-
agement systems face the challenge of shifting from purely mitigating technologies to
ones that address the underlying causes of incident threats.12 This complex techno-
logical evolution is clearly affected by the specific relationship between infrastructure
investors, who are often private, and public decision-makers.
Overview of the model. We consider a two-period relationship between a public au-
thority (the principal) and a firm (the agent) for the provision of a public service. Con-
tracts are plagued with dynamic moral hazard and uncertainty on climate change is
resolved over time. The firm exerts non-verifiable efforts (or investments) in each pe-
riod of the relationship. Efforts are privately costly but yield, with some probability,
some extra social value beyond a base level. The firm is protected by limited liability
and must receive rents in each period to exert efforts.13
In contrast with standard dynamic agency models,14 which assume that effort only
pays off in the current period, the first important specificity of our environment is
the existence of an irreversibility constraint that links efforts at different points in time.
More precisely, the second-period effort cannot be lower than the first-period one. Such
linkage is indeed quite natural for infrastructure projects, whose development can of-
9World Development Report (2010).
10Shalizi and Lecocq (2009), Davis et al. (2010).
11Kerr (2010).
12Vo¨ro¨smarty et al. (2010).
13Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 4).
14Rogerson (1985) and Olhendorf and Schmitz (2008) among many others.
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ten be decomposed into different stages (the decomposition between “build and operate”
in the vocable coined by PPPs practitioners). For instance, if a bigger infrastructure is
chosen earlier on, more follow-up investments and maintenance are certainly needed
later on. In between these two stages, uncertainty on climate shocks is resolved and
affects the second-period return on the agent’s effort.
Because of the initial uncertainty over future productivity shocks, there is an option
value of waiting until such uncertainty gets resolved before undertaking any invest-
ment with long-term irreversible effects. This important lesson is well-known from
the seminal works of Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
and Kolstad (1996). In the context of our model, a high (resp. low) first-period effort
makes it more (resp. less) likely that the irreversibility constraint binds. Incentives to
keep flexibility call for reducing the first-period investment. Contrary to this earlier
literature, which focused on the consequences of such irreversibility in a non-strategic
context, we embedd these flexibility motives in an agency relationship.
The consequences are twofold. First, uncertainty on climate changes makes it im-
possible to write long-term contracts conditional on future climate contingencies. Del-
egation to the private sector takes place in a highly incomplete contracting environ-
ment. Second, the principal and the agent may disagree on how much flexibility to
keep and, even if they agree under some circumstances, it may be at the cost for the
principal of giving up more rent to the agent. The combination of irreversibility and
ex ante uncertainty on future productivity shocks creates an option value of delaying
first-period investment to keep flexibility in second-period effort. In an agency context,
this exacerbates the difficulty of providing incentives in earlier phases of the project.
Considering different scenarios corresponding to various degrees of contractual in-
completeness, our analysis unveils how the agency problem between the public sector
and the private sector is actually exacerbated by the firm’s incentives to underinvest in
the earlier period so as to maintain flexibility for the future.
Overview of our findings. The very logic of the irreversibility literature immediately
explains why the firm’s incentives to keep flexibility for the second period dampens
its first-period effort. In an agency context, those distorted incentives directly impact
on the design of incentive schemes over both periods of the relationship since the prin-
cipal wants to control of how much flexibility is delegated to the agent. This impact
comes through two different channels. First, a Commitment Effect captures how a lower
first-period effort affects agency costs not only in the first but also in the second pe-
riod whenever the firm is actually constrained by its earlier commitment. Second, a
Flexibility Effect measures the sensitivity of a second-period effort to incentives under
all favorable circumstances where this earlier commitment is not binding. It turns out
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that those two effects go in opposite directions.
To illustrate, consider the case of an agent who is less responsive to incentive pay-
ments at lower levels of effort. Technically speaking, this means that his effort supply
is less elastic for lower rewards. To incentivize first-period effort despite the counter-
vailing impact of the agent’s incentives for keeping flexibility, the principal must thus
raise significantly the first-period payment and shift more rent towards the agent in
that period. The Commitment Effect then pushes the first-period reward ups. A con-
trario, since the firm’s effort supply is more elastic for higher rewards, it becomes less
attractive to raise second-period payments to incentivize the second-period effort un-
der all favorable realizations of the productivity shock. The optimal contract entails
decreasing incentives over time. By a reverse argument, increasing incentives arise
when the effort supply is non-increasing.
Our analysis also unveils to what extent other organizational and technological
choices have attractive properties in view of reducing the agency costs of delegated
flexibility.
Echoing the theoretical literature on the costs and benefits of PPPs in agency con-
texts,15 we first show that a commitment to unbundle the different stages of the project
between different firms prevents the perverse incentives for flexibility. Along the same
lines, keeping contracts somewhat incomplete and short-term reaches an even better
outcome even if a single firm is in charge at different points in time. With such short-
term contracting, the principal can delay future rounds of contracting until productiv-
ity shocks are known. This shifts the flexibility motives from the agent to the principal
himself, reduces agency costs and definitively improves contractual performances.
Finally, we demonstrate that it might be optimal to adopt a more costly technology
if it improves flexibility against environmental shocks. This highlights why the cur-
rent process of increased environmental uncertainty may entail a shift towards more
flexible, although possibly less efficient, technologies and suggests a possible substi-
tutability between contractual and technological choices.16
Organization of the paper. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 offers two polar
benchmarks. In the first one, the principal can perfectly control efforts. We recast there
standard results of the irreversibility literature in the framework of our model. The
15See, among others, Benz, Grout and Hallonen (2001), Hart (2003), Bennet and Iossa (2008), Mar-
timort and Pouyet (2008), Iossa and Martimort (2008) for static models, Schmitz (2005) and Iossa and
Martimort (2011) for dynamic ones.
16A fairly large literature has dealt with the issue of technological change in the presence of climate
change, mostly in the context of growth models, as exemplified by the early work of Nordhaus (1994)
and more recently by Acemoglu et al. (2012) work on directed technical change. However, to our knowl-
edge none of these contributions have analyzed incentives for technological change in the presence of
significant uncertainty on climate change.
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second scenario addresses what happens with myopic players who do not care about
the impact of their current decisions on the future. Section 4 analyzes the agency re-
lationship between the government and the firm to whom it delegates the two-stage
project. We attach particular attention to the agent’s intertemporal incentive constraint
and the new agency costs of delegated flexibility. Section 5 characterizes optimal con-
tracts. This analysis stresses that optimal contracts result from a trade-off between a
Commitment Effect and a Flexibility Effect. Section 6 highlights the role of various orga-
nizational choices that reduces those agency costs. Section 7 addresses technological
choices. Section 8 offers a critical view of the PPP model in light of our findings. Fi-
nally, Section 9 concludes highlighting some avenues for future research. Proofs are
relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Technology. Consider a public-private partnership contract between a government
(hereafter often referred to as the “principal”) and a private firm (the “agent”) for the
provision of a public service (for instance energy, water, sanitation or transportation).
Typically, PPP contracts may grant a concession for twenty to thirty years to the private
sector. For the purpose of the model, we only consider two stages: an initial investment
period at date 1 and a follow-up investment or maintenance period at date 2.
We denote by δ the common discount factor of these players.17 This parameter can
also be viewed as an index of the length of the accounting period.
In the first stage, the agent invests in an infrastructure which basic social value is
S0 > 0. If the design turns out to be successful, this social value increases to S0 + S,
where S > 0. The project is successful with probability e1, where e1 is the firm’s effort
in the first period. This effort may be viewed as a (size-related) investment that affects
the project’s social value (for instance the quality of a water or sanitation network, or
the design of a transport system).
Exerting such effort has a cost ψ(e1) for the agent.18 Following the agency litera-
ture,19 the quantity R(e) = eψ′(e)−ψ(e) denotes the agent’s liability rent when exerting
effort e. Anticipating on what follows, this quantity is the amount that must be con-
17The Stern report (2007) suggests to take a social discount rate of 1.3 percent to reflect the compound-
ing effects of future growth rate and marginal utility of consumption. Dasgupta (2007) discusses the
ethical arguments behind this choice.
18For technical reasons, and unless stipulated otherwise, we assume that ψ(0) = ψ′(0) = 0, ψ′(e) ≥ 0,
ψ′′(e) > 0, and ψ′′′(e) ≥ 0 and that ψ(·) is convex enough to ensure that optimal efforts are interior to
the interval (0, 1) under all circumstances below. Note that the Inada condition ψ′(1) = +∞ would be
sufficient in this respect.
19See Laffont and Matimort (2002, Chapter 4) for instance.
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ceded to the agent when agency costs undermine delegated management.20 For further
references, we also denote by ϕ ≡ ψ′−1 the inverse function of ψ′. As we will see be-
low, ϕ(t) is the agent’s effort supply when he receives a reward t in case of successful
investment.21 Let then ε(t) = tϕ
′(t)
ϕ(t)
denote the supply elasticity. Much of our results be-
low will depend on the monotonicity properties of this elasticity. One can verify that
ε(·) is non-decreasing if and only if eψ′′(e)
ψ′(e) is non-increasing.
22 In other words, a greater
elasticity of effort supply means that the marginal disutility of effort has itself a lower
elasticity, which amounts to saying that the firm is less responsive to incentives as its
effort increases.
In the second period of the relationship, the agent must perform some complemen-
tary investment to keep the infrastructure viable or exert some maintenance of existing
assets. This investment is again successful and yields an extra return S, with some
probability that will be specified below as depending on the agent’s second-period ef-
fort e2, as well as on a productivity shock. Exerting this second-stage effort costs ψ(e2).
Irreversibility. We follow the standard approach of the irreversibility literature (Arrow
and Fisher 1974, Henry 1974, and Dixit and Pindyck 1994, among others) and assume
that the first-period effort affects the second-period production function: Once an in-
frastructure of a given size has been set up, the firm must ensure a minimum follow-up
level of investment/maintenance. This irreversibility is thus captured through the fol-
lowing simple intertemporal irreversibility constraint:
e2 ≥ e1.23 (1)
Uncertainty on Climate Shocks. Uncertain climate shocks affect the second-period
probability of the project generating social value, which we write as θe2 if second pe-
riod effort is e2. The parameter θ is a productivity shock linked to climate change. This
shock is distributed over a finite support [0, θ¯] according to a cumulative distribution
F with an everywhere positive and atomless density f = F ′. Observe that, under the
worst scenario (i.e., θ = 0), the project no longer generates any value in the second
20Our technical assumptions imply thatR(0) = 0,R′(e) = eψ′′(e) ≥ 0 andR′′(e) = eψ′′′(e)+ψ′′(e) > 0.




22For instance, ψ(e) = λ e
1+α
1+α (with α ≥ 0 and λ > 0) is such that ε˙(t) ≡ 0, while ψ(e) = λ exp(re)−1−rer
(with r > 0 and λ > 0) is such that ε˙(t) ≤ 0, and ψ(e) = λlog(1 + e2) (with λ > 0) is such that ε˙(t) ≥ 0.
23To interpret this constraint, one may think of a water or a road project, which long-term social value
depends on realizing additional investments that are positively related to the initial sunk investment.
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period. This captures the possibility that climate shocks may have a really detrimental
impact on welfare.24
Let Eθ(·) denote the expectation operator with respect to θ. For simplicity, we as-
sume that Eθ(θ) = 1. On “average”, the probabilities of success in the first and second
periods are identical if efforts at those dates are the same. In other words, agents be-
lieve that shocks follow no intertemporal trend. This simplifying assumption allows
us to focus on the pure role of uncertainty in affecting first-period investment.
Indeed, date 2 realizations of the productivity shock θ are uncertain at date 1. How-
ever, this shock becomes common knowledge at the time of choosing second-period
effort. As we will see below, the irreversibility constraint (1) is only binding follow-
ing an adverse evolution of the environment, since it reduces the marginal return on
second-period effort. This justifies reducing investment at an earlier stage even in the
absence of any agency problem. Our analysis will unveil how incentives for flexibility
are modified in an agency context.
Contracts. The firm’s efforts in both periods are non-verifiable. The firm is protected
by limited liability and cannot make losses in any period.25 Indeed, profits in any
period are redistributed as dividends to the firm’s owners in the same period.26 In lines
with standard moral hazard problems under limited liability, incentives can thus only
be provided by rewarding the firm in case the incremental social value S is realized.27
Together, nonverifiability and limited liability create agency costs. A convenient design
of dynamic contracts will limit the liability rent that accrues to the firm.
For most of the paper, the relationship between the government and the firm is run
by a long-term contract that covers both periods. Although, the productivity shock θ is
common knowledge at date 2 and ex post verifiable, the contingencies underlying the
resulting θ cannot be foreseen ex ante. Thus, long-term contracts contingent on those
shocks cannot be written and the only feasible contracts entail a pooling second-period
payment independent of θ. This assumption captures the extreme incompleteness sur-
rounding contracting when climate may evolve in unpredictable ways.
24This simple formalization of climate shocks is in lines with the practical outcomes of even the most
sophisticated modeling and simulation exercises currently available. Indeed, these exercises offer rough
assessments of the impact of extreme events, such as probabilities of exceeding given risk thresholds
(e.g., Pall et al., 2011).
25Alternatively, the firm is not sufficiently diversified and can be viewed as being infinitely risk-averse
below zero wealth; an assumption that may be relevant for ventures involved in large projects, which
may have a constrained access to the financial market.
26This simplifying assumption implies that the firm cannot build a buffer of wealth to relax its liability
constraint in the future.
27This assumption echoes real-world practices. PPP contracts often specify revenues sharing rules.
We refer to Iossa and Martimort (2008, 2011) for an in-depth description.
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Let denote by (t1, t2) such long-term contract, i.e., a profile of per-period rewards to
the firm following good performances in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
Remark 1 Although contracts may depend on calendar time, history-dependent contracts are
ruled out. In full generality, the second-period reward could depend on whether a success or
a failure took place earlier on. With obvious notations, such history-dependent contract would
write as {t1, t2(S), t2(F )}. The role of history-dependent contracts in dynamic agency models
is by now well known, especially since Rogerson (1985) in settings where agents are risk averse
and, more recently, Olhendorf and Schmitz (2008) when risk-neutral agents are protected by
limited liability as in our context. These papers show that using memory (and especially, setting
up larger second-period rewards in case of earlier success, i.e., t2(S) > t2(F )) provides cheaper
incentives. Ruling out history dependence allows us to focus on new issues that, in a full-
fledged model, would superimpose to those well-known from this earlier literature.28
Preferences. Up to some constant terms related to the basic social value of the infras-
tructure S0, the principal’s intertemporal payoff can be written as:
V (t1, t2, e1, e2(·)) = e1(S − t1) + δEθ(θe2(θt2, e1))(S − t2), (2)
where the second-period effort e2(θt2, e1) depends a priori on the realized productivity
shock, the second-period incentive reward t2 and the earlier effort e1.29
Taking into account that the firm controls investments in both periods, its intertem-
poral profit can be expressed as:
U(t1, t2) = max
e1
{







28Several justifications can be given to rule out history-dependent contracts. First, governments in
charge of implementing new infrastructures may have to rely on regulatory agencies and dedicated
bureaucracies to obtain information on performances, a process that might not be immune to capture
and manipulations. Stationary contracts are less sensitive to such manipulations and may be attractive
in this respect. Second, history-dependent contracts require that the government be able to commit
to delay rewards. In contexts with weak contractual enforcement, the government may renege on his
commitment, and the firm may have little choice except to accept new contractual terms. (In a related
context, Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 8, p. 349) discuss the limited feasibility of delayed payments
in dynamic contractual relationships.) Third, our model can be reinterpreted mutatis mutandis as if the
efforts were observable but contracts were incomplete in the following sense: Suppose that ei is no
longer a probability but an input, whose social return is e1S in the first period and θe2S in the second.
Those returns are no longer random. With that alternative interpretation in mind, the payments ti/S
can be viewed as a per unit price paid to the firm. Because returns are no longer random, there is only
“one” past history.
29We simplify the analysis by giving zero weight to the firm’s profit in the government’s objectives.
This is in particular relevant when foreign firms are involved in managing and building key infrastruc-
tures. Following Baron and Myerson (1982), our results would be robust if the firm’s profit receives a
non-negative weight α < 1 in the government’s objective function.
10
This yields the following expression of the second-period effort e2(θt2, e1) as:
e2(θt2, e1) = arg max
e2≥e1
θe2t2 − ψ(e2) (4)
3 Useful Benchmarks
3.1 Optimal Flexibility without Agency Costs
As a benchmark, consider the hypothetical setting where the government invests in
both periods by himself (or, more precisely controls the effort of a public enterprise).30
Alternatively, this setting also corresponds to the case where efforts are verifiable and
can be contracted upon ex ante. This section will thus recap basic results from the
irreversibility literature to facilitate future comparisons.
Suppose that the principal knows θ before choosing his second-period effort. An











From there, we immediately obtain the expression of the second-period effort:
e2(θS, e1) = max{ϕ(θS), e1}.
The second-period effort is constrained by the earlier commitment only if the produc-
tivity shock is sufficiently adverse, i.e., θ ≤ ψ′(e1)
S
. Then, the marginal return on second-
period effort is too small to ensure that the irreversibility constraint is slack.
Inserting the expression of the second-period effort into the principal’s intertempo-
ral payoff, we obtain:
max
e1
e1S − ψ(e1) + δ
∫ ψ′(e1)S
0






Optimizing yields an optimal level of effort in the first-period ei1 worth:
ei1 = ϕ(ζ(δ, 1)S) < ϕ(S), (5)
30We follow Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) in assuming that such public firm has access to the same
technology as the private sector.
31Where the superscript i is meant for “informed”.
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where ζ(δ, 1) is the unique solution in (0, 1) to the equation




Everything happens as if the value of the first-period investment was reduced to take
into account the flexibility motives. Note that a myopic principal, i.e., one with δ = 0,
would choose an effort level ϕ(S). To gain flexibility over a wider region of possible
realizations of θ, a less myopic principal reduces his first-period investment below that
amount. This delays effort provision till the productivity shock θ is known.
Observe that the threshold value of the productivity shock ζ(δ, 1) below which an
earlier commitment is binding (i.e., e2(θS, e1) = e1 when θ ≤ ζ(δ, 1)) is below the mean:
ζ(δ, 1) < 1 = Eθ(θ).
This illustrates the principal’s bias towards keeping flexibility even in the absence of
any agency problem. Later on, we will see how this threshold changes when agency
costs are explicitly taken into account.
Finally, observe that the second-period effort ei2(θ) is easily derived as:
ei2(θ) = ϕ (max{ζ(δ, 1), θ}S) .
Remark 2 As δ increases, ζ(δ, 1) decreases and the less myopic principal underinvests more.32
3.2 Myopic Players and Agency Costs
Consider the case of myopic players who care only about the first period, i.e., δ = 0.
In that context, flexibility motives are de facto irrelevant; neither the principal nor the
agent anticipate an impact of their first-period choices on the future. The first-period
relationship boils down to a static model where the firm receives a reward t in case of
success. We first derive the optimal static contract in this environment.
Incentive compatibility leads to the following expression of effort at that date:
e1 = arg max
e˜1
e˜1t− ψ(e˜1)⇔ e1 = ϕ(t).
32As δ decreases towards zero and the second contracting period matters less, ζ(δ, 1) obviously con-
verges to one. When the principal is myopic, his first-period effort is a constraint on his future choice
only when productivity shocks are below the mean.
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This allows us to express the principal’s expected payoff as:
(S − t)ϕ(t).
The optimal stationary reward t(1) maximizes this expression, solving the familiar
first-order condition:33




The principal faces a rent-efficiency trade-off. Increasing the reward boosts incentives
and raises the probability of success but it also decreases the principal’s net surplus.
Note that the optimal reward t(1) is closer to S as the elasticity of effort supply
ε(·) is itself greater, i.e., when the marginal disutility of effort has a greater elasticity.
In other words, as ε(·) increases, the rent-efficiency trade-off is further tilted towards
leaving more rent to the agent.
Consider now the second period and suppose, as a benchmark, that there is no irre-
versibility constraint. The probability of success is now affected by a common knowl-
edge shock θ so that it becomes θe. We are here interested in how the agent’s optimal
reward varies with the productivity shock.
Incentive compatibility now becomes:
e2 = arg max
e˜2
θe˜2t− ψ(e˜2)⇔ e2 = ϕ(θt).
Equation (7) is modified accordingly as:




Consider now two productivity shocks, θ ≥ θ′. Observe that t(θ) ≥ t(θ′) (resp. ≤) if,




ϕ(θ′t) (resp. ≤), which holds if and only if the elasticity of effort
supply ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing).
In other words, when this elasticity is non-decreasing, the agent’s effort supply is
less responsive to incentives if a more favorable shock hits in the second period. Opti-
mal rewards must be increased to provide incentives. The trade-off between efficiency
and extraction of the firm’s liability rent is tilted in favor of the firm, and more rent
must be given up by the principal. When the probability of success is affected by pro-
ductivity shocks, the monotonicity of ε(·) thus gives some insights about how stringent
agency costs are. Those insights will be useful to build further intuition for the shape
33Under the assumptions made on ψ (and thus ϕ), the problem is quasi-concave. Indeed, the function
t+ ϕ(t)ϕ′(t) is increasing in t when ϕ is concave (i.e., ψ
′ is convex).
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of the firm’s intertemporal incentive problem in Section 4 below.
4 Delegated Flexibility: Incentive Compatibility
Suppose now that the government delegates the tasks of investing to the firm. This
section analyzes incentive compatibility constraints in that scenario.
Thanks to the concavity of the firm’s objective function in (3), we get the follow-
ing expression for second-period incentive compatibility, where again we make the
dependence of second-period effort on e1 and t2 explicit:
e2(θt2, e1) = arg max
e2≥e1
θe2t2 − ψ(e2) =⇒ e2(θt2, e1) = max{ϕ(θt2), e1}. (9)
The irreversibility constraint is again binding for adverse shocks, i.e., when θ is low
enough, as it was already the case without any agency problem. For such adverse real-
izations of the shock, the firm would like to exert less second-period effort than what
it has already committed to through its first-period investment. Because disinvesting
is not possible, the firm underinvests in the first period to keep some flexibility.
This is of course very similar to the incentive problem faced by the principal when
he invests by himself. The important issue investigated in this section is to what ex-
tent the agent and his principal evaluate differently those incentives for flexibility and
whether it can be a source of extra rent for the agent.
To understand the firm’s incentives to underinvest, let us insert the expression of
e2(θt2, e1), given in (9), into (3). The firm’s intertemporal payoff becomes:











Optimizing with respect to e1 yields the following expression of the first-period
incentive compatibility constraint:





To better understand the design of an optimal contract, let us introduce the scale
parameter γ such that t2 = γt1. For future reference, and much in the spirit of what
we did in Section 3.1, let us also denote by ζ(δ, γ) the unique solution in the interval
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The agent constrained by his initial investment, i.e., e2 = e1, when θ ≤ ζ(δ, γ).
That ζ(δ, γ) is decreasing in γ simply means that the first-period effort decreases
as the first-period reward decreases relatively to the second-period one. This boosts
flexibility and makes it more attractive to invest in the second period.
With those notations at hands, the firm’s first-period incentive constraint becomes:











where the dependence on the whole profile of rewards (t1, t2) is made explicit.
Remark 3 Let us briefly come back on our assumption that there is “no intertemporal trend” in
productivity shocks (i.e., Eθ(θ) = 1). The possibility of such trends (i.e., Eθ(θ) < 1, resp. >, for
a decreasing, resp. decreasing, trend) can be equivalently modeled by assuming that first- and
second-period surplus differ, i.e., S2 < S1 ( resp. >). This is just a matter of renormalization.
When the principal controls efforts, the first-period decision will be biased towards a lower








− δ ∫ ζ(δ,S2S1 )0 F (θ)dθ.
The incentive constraint (12) looks pretty similar to (5), which describes the prin-
cipal’s optimal choices. Had the principal used a stationary contract t1 = t2, the irre-
versibility constraint would again be binding if and only if θ ≤ ζ(δ, 1). With stationary
contracts, the principal and the agent agree on what should be the optimal level of
flexibility. They are constrained by their first-period effort choices over the same range
of realizations of the productivity shock even though these choices may differ.
The next property is useful to build intuition on our future results:




Raising t2 of course boosts the second-period effort when (1) is slack but at the same
time it also makes it more attractive to invest in the first period since the irreversibility
constraint is less likely to be binding.
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5 Delegated Flexibility: Optimal Contracts
5.1 Stationary Contracts
Given the large uncertainty surrounding climate change, it might sometimes be diffi-
cult to distinguish between several pre-defined contracting periods with different cli-
matic conditions. In other words, the productivity shocks might just arise at a date that
is left unspecified in the contract. Such extra degree of contract incompleteness can be
modeled by assuming that parties can only use stationary contracts. In this section,
we investigate the possible distortions in that case. This analysis is useful in view of
building intuition for the more complex case of non-stationary contracts.
Let denote by t = t1 = t2 such stationary reward. As already mentioned, with
stationary contracts, the principal and the agent agree on what should be the optimal
level of flexibility. The irreversibility constraint is again binding if and only if θ ≤
ζ(δ, 1). From (12), the first-period effort becomes
e1(t) = ϕ(ζ(δ, 1)t) (13)
(where we make explicit the dependence on t) while the second-period effort is
e2(θ, t) = ϕ(max{θ, ζ(δ, 1)}t). (14)
With those expressions of efforts, the principal’s intertemporal payoff becomes:












This expression of the principal’s welfare highlights that, with stationary contracts,
everything happens as if the environment was itself stationary with an “average” effort
supply for each period (or probability of success ) being now given by Φ(t, δ).
Optimal stationary contracts. Optimizing the principal’s intertemporal payoff yields
a familiar expression for the optimal per-period reward ts(δ):







Comparative statics. To highlight the different effects at play in determining ts(δ), it is
useful to view Φ(t, δ) as the product of two factors:
















Taking log-derivatives allows us to decompose the elasticity of Φ(t, δ) as the sum of a






































To understand the respective role of those two effects, consider first a fictitious static
model where the probability of success would be ϕ(ζ(δ, 1)t) and the principal’s payoff
(S−t)ϕ(ζ(δ, 1)t). In such fictitious model, only the Commitment Effect would thus matter
and the optimal reward tˆ(δ) would solve:




The Commitment Effect captures the idea that the (first-period) reward t has an im-
pact not only on the first-period effort but also on the second-period one as long as
the irreversibility constraint is binding. This effect is partially dissipated by the agent’s
incentives for flexibility. Indeed, everything happens as if only a fraction ζ(δ, 1) of
the first-period reward affects the first-period effort, or equivalently as if a “virtual”
productivity shock ζ(δ, 1) < 1 had hit in that first period. Taking into account that
ζ(δ, 1) < 1, Proposition 1 is an immediate implication of our findings in Section 3.2.
Proposition 1
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)⇒ tˆ(δ) ≤ t(1) (resp. ≥). (21)
The Commitment Effect reduces (resp. increases) the optimal reward compared with
the myopic scenario when ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing). The intuition
is similar to that we developed in Section 3.2. In this fictitious static model, the “vir-
tual” productivity shock ζ(δ, 1) < 1 makes the firm more (resp. less) responsive to
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incentives at that date when ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing). The first-
period rent-efficiency trade-off is thus tilted towards the principal (resp. the agent).
As can be seen from (19), the Flexibility Effect measures instead the relative impact
of the (second-period) reward t on the second-period probability of success over all
favorable events θ ≥ ζ(δ, 1) where the irreversibility constraint is slack. The sign of this
effect follows from next Lemma.
Lemma 2






≥ 0 (resp. ≤) ∀t, ∀θ ≥ θ′.
Applying Lemma 2 to the case where θ ≥ θ′ = ζ(δ, 1), we observe that the Flexibility
Effect boosts (resp. reduces ) the elasticity of Φ(t, δ) when ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp.
non-increasing). This effect matters when the irreversibility constraint is slack over the
second period, i.e., precisely when the Commitment Effect does not matter. Proposition
2 compares now tˆ(δ) with ts(δ). It confirms that the Flexibility Effect always attenuates
the Commitment Effect and brings the optimal reward closer to t(1).
Proposition 2
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)⇒ ts(δ) ≥ tˆ(δ) (resp. ≤). (22)
This proposition points the trade-off between commitment and flexibility.34 When-
ever the Commitment Effect reduces (resp. increases) the stationary reward, the Flexibil-
ity Effect makes it attractive to increase (resp. decrease) this reward to benefit from a
greater flexibility when the irreversibility constraint does not bind.
Intuitively, the delegated incentives for keeping flexibility make the firm play on
the intertemporal distribution of rents it can get over both periods; pushing forward
(resp. backward) rents when ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing). Those in-
centives decrease the first-period effort pushing it towards regions where the firm is
more responsive to incentives when ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing). This
first-period force leads the principal to reduce (resp. increase) the optimal reward ac-
cordingly. At the same time, the principal would like to increase (resp. decrease) the
second-period reward to enjoy more of the firm’s flexibility following good shocks.
34Boyer and Robert (2006) also analyzed the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in a frame-
work where private information is the source of the intertemporal linkage across periods.
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5.2 Non-Stationary Contracts
Non-stationary policies might a priori be attractive because the principal may no longer
be as much torn between the conflicting forces of the Commitment and Flexibility Effects
as shown above.
With non-stationary policies, the principal might want to boost first-period incen-
tives by offering greater rewards earlier on, i.e., t1 > t2. Although it improves first-
period investment, this policy makes it also more likely that the irreversibility con-
straint (1) binds. In other words, the project may start “big” and generate unneces-
sary constraints under adverse circumstances later on. On the contrary, the principal
might want to favor adaptation and flexibility in the second period. This is obtained
by boosting second-period incentives with increasing rewards, i.e., t1 < t2. In that case,
the project may start “small”.
Definition 1 A profile has decreasing (resp. increasing, stationary) incentives when γ < 1
(resp. >, =).
In terms of actual PPP practices, several contractual dimensions that shift the power
of incentives, including asset ownership, duration and compensation terms, might be
relevant to think of applications of the different scenarios analyzed here. For example,
the shift from having high-powered incentives earlier on to low-powered incentives
later in the relationship that arises when γ < 1, might be viewed as a feature of PPP
projects such as ‘Build-Operate-Transfer’ (BOT), in which ownership is relinquished
to the public sector at the end of the contracting period. Alternatively, concession con-
tracts contemplating ultimate divestiture of assets such as ‘Build-Operate-Own’ (BOO),
i.e., in which operators end up being owners at the end of the franchise, may be good
proxies for the case γ > 1.35
Each of these non-stationary policies may turn out to be optimal, depending again
on the properties of the elasticity of effort supply.
Proposition 3 Assume quasi-concavity of this principal’s objective function in (t2, γ) where
γ = t2
t1
. The optimal long-term contract (t∗1(δ), t∗2(δ) = γ∗(δ)t∗1(δ)) is such that:
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing, stationary)⇒ γ∗(δ) ≥ 1 (resp. ≤, =). (23)
In the context of non-stationary contracts, we can think of the Flexibility Effect as a
tendency to increase the relative reward t2
t1
, i.e., to raise γ, while the Commitment Effect
corresponds instead to the tendency to decrease this relative reward, i.e., to reduce γ.
35We develop this discussion further in Section 8.
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When ε(·) is non-decreasing, we know from Section 5.1 that raising the second-
period reward is attractive because the firm is then more responsive to incentives fol-
lowing favorable productivity shocks. With non-stationary contracts, the Flexibility
Effect then dominates and leads to a non-decreasing profile of rewards (γ > 1). When
ε(·) is instead non-increasing, the firm is less responsive to incentives following favor-
able shocks. The Commitment Effect dominates and leads to a non-increasing profile of
rewards (γ < 1).
With stationary contracts, the principal and the agent agree on how much flexibility
should be kept. Since optimal contracts might be non-stationary, a conflict might exist
between the principal and the agent on the optimal degree of flexibility. This conflicts
reflects the pattern of intertemporal rewards.
Corollary 1
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing, constant)⇒ ζ(δ, γ∗(δ)) ≤ ζ(δ, 1) (resp. ≥, =).
(24)
6 Organizational Choices
Much of the debate on the costs and benefits of PPPs over more traditional forms of
procurement hinges on the comparison of agency and transaction costs involved under
alternative organizational scenarios.
Under bundling, viewed as a metaphor for the case of PPPs, different tasks corre-
sponding to different stages of a project are performed by the same firm or consortium.
Instead, under unbundling, different firms are in charge with different stages of the
project. The thrust of the existing literature is that bundling may be beneficial when
it internalizes some contractual externalities, making it cheaper to provide incentives
when different tasks are jointly controlled by the same firm.
Our dynamic agency model, where efforts are performed sequentially, raises sim-
ilar issues. As we shall see below, the comparison of agency costs under alternative
scenarios nevertheless depends on the degree of contractual incompleteness.
6.1 The Benefits of Unbundling
To get at the costs and benefits of bundling tasks, consider first a scenario in which
the principal commits ex ante to deal with two different firms, which act at different
dates and receive the corresponding payments t1 and t2. Under unbundling, the firm
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in charge in the first period does not internalize the impact of its first-period effort on
future effort, so that:
e1 = ϕ(t1).







Clearly, the irreversibility constraint is now binding more often than if bundling
was chosen. It turns out that this decreased flexibility benefits the principal. Indeed,
the principal prefers that the first-period agent does not anticipate the consequences of
his own effort on future choices. Instead, under bundling, the principal cannot prevent
the first-period agent from keeping some flexibility for his own future choices. Taking a
broader perspective, this result is another instance of a basic principle of multi-tasking
models a` la Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), applied to the PPP literature: Bundling
tasks may increase first-period agency costs. In our context, this principle strikes again.
Part of the first-period reward gets dissipated by the agent’s incentives for flexibility.
Proposition 4 With long-term contracts and unbundling, the first-period firm’s effort re-
sponds only to first-period incentives. First-period incentives are cheaper than under bundling.
Unbundling is the principal’s preferred organizational form.
Importantly, Proposition 4 suggests that it is worth limiting contract length in un-
certain environments. This points at a novel cost of PPPs.
6.2 Short-Term Contracts
Let us come back to our initial bundling scenario, with a single firm in charge over both
periods, but assume now that no long-term contract can be signed. In such a highly
incomplete contracting environment, parties leave open the possibility of drafting new
contracts when the productivity shock becomes common knowledge and verifiable.
A priori, the cost of such scenario could be the principal’s limited ability to control
the agent’s first-period effort through a commitment to second-period rewards. The
benefit is that, by waiting for the relevant information, second-period incentives can
be better tailored to the realization of the productivity shock. In other words, short-
term contracts allow the principal to better control the degree of flexibility kept by the
firm. We will see below that this control can indeed be perfect.
Under short-term contracting, the principal forms a conjecture on the first-period
(non-observable) effort, say ee1, at the time of drafting second-period contracts. In the
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second-period, the spot contract implements the optimal reward t2(θ) = t(θ) exactly
as in Section 3.2 as long as the second-period effort it induces is unconstrained by the
first-period choice, i.e., when
ϕ(θt(θ)) ≥ ee1. (25)
Instead, when this inequality does not hold, the principal offers a second-period re-
ward t2(θ) that just implements a second-period effort worth ee1.
ϕ(θt2(θ)) = e
e
1 ⇔ θt2(θ) = ψ′(ee1). (26)
Observe that θt(θ) is increasing in θ; in other words, the second-period effort in-
creases with the productivity shock.36 Hence, there exists a cut-off θ∗(ee1) such that the
irreversibility constraint is only binding (resp. slack) for all θ ≤ θ∗(ee1) (resp. ≥).
Using the expression of t2(θ) coming from (26) when the irreversibility constraint is
binding, we can rewrite the firm’s intertemporal payoff as:
max
e1
e1t1 − ψ(e1) + δ
(∫ θ∗(ee1)
0






Optimizing and taking into account that conjectures are correct at equilibrium leads
to the surprisingly simple expression of the first-period incentive constraint:
e1 = ϕ(t1). (27)
This is the same incentive constraint as with a myopic firm that does not take the
impact of its first-period effort on future opportunities into account. Intuitively, the
fact that second-period rewards depends only on the principal’s conjecture on the first-
period effort and not on its exact value makes it now irrelevant for the agent to try to
manipulate the irreversibility constraint by choosing the first-period effort. In other
words, the principal’s ability to delay second-period contracting untill the productiv-
ity shock becomes common knowledge removes all the agent’s incentives for keeping
flexibility. Even with a single firm in charge at both dates, the principal can now repli-
cate the unbundling scenario. The extra benefit compared with Section 6.1 is that date
2 contract can now depend explicitly on the realization of θ.
Proposition 5 With short-term contracts,






• The optimal first-period reward tst1 is such that:









if θ ≤ ζ(δ, 1)
t(θ) if θ ≥ ζ(δ, 1).
(29)
The first-period agency cost on the right-hand side of (28) has the same form as
that obtained with myopic players in Section 3.2. The left-hand side is nevertheless
different. Everything happens as if the the first-period social value of the project was
discounted by the familiar term ζ(δ, 1), i.e., by the same amount as with no delegation
(see Section 3.1). In other words, the principal is not myopic himself.
As a result, rewards and efforts are reduced in that scenario:
tst1 < t(1).
Written in terms of effort, (28) becomes:
ζ(δ, 1)S = ψ′(est1 ) +R
′(est1 ). (30)




Compared with the scenario in Section 3.1, effort is downward distorted to reduce the
firm’s rent.
With short-term contracts, the principal is now able to better control the agent. By
designing contracts once shocks are common knowledge, the principal keeps full con-
trol on the degree of flexibility needed in the first period.
Remark 4 Proposition 5 also describes the outcome that is achieved under an unbundling
scenario when the principal can commit upfront to offer a second-period reward that depends
on the productivity shocks. Of course, such possibility would require that climate contingencies
are perfectly foreseen, an extreme assumption.
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7 Technological Choices
An important question for long-lived infrastructures in the context of climate change is
to determine how flexible technologies should be. When designing a long-term project,
contracting parties may indeed opt for technologies with low exposure to climatic haz-
ards even if such choice is ex ante costly.37 For example, a water company may chose
to invest in safer extraction technologies to limit subsequent risk of contamination, or a
road concessionaire may include in the project design a number of features that reduce
the exposure of the road itself to floods and heavy precipitations.
To model such issues, we consider the choice within a continuum of potential tech-
nologies indexed by some parameter α which characterizes the level of exposure to the
productivity shock θ. Adopting an α-technology costs C(α) (with C(0) = C ′(0) = 0,
C ′(α) ≥ 0 and C ′′(α) > 0). Assuming that this technological choice is verifiable, it is
just an accounting convention to consider that the principal fully bears that cost. Im-
portantly, the choice of a less costly α-technology exacerbates the impact of climate
shocks on productivity. More precisely, we assume that the distribution F (·|α1) is a
mean-preserving spread transformation of F (·|α2) whenever α1 < α2. Assuming dif-










(x|α)dx = 0. (31)
A lower α-technology, which is less costly, implies more uncertainty on θ around the
“mean scenario” Eθ(θ) = 1. Instead, by investing more ex ante, parties ensure that
random productivity shocks will be closer to that mean.
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the case of stationary contracts t1 = t2 = t
although similar insights would apply in less incomplete environments. Making the
dependence of ζ(δ, 1, α) on α explicit, the first-period incentive compatibility constraint
becomes:
e1(t) = ϕ(ζ(δ, 1, α)t) (32)
with
ζ(δ, 1, α) = 1− δ
∫ ζ(δ,1,α)
0
F (θ|α)dθ < 1. (33)
Lemma 3 The firm chooses less flexibility as α increases:
∂ζ
∂α
(δ, 1, α) > 0. (34)
37For earlier references on technological flexibility, we refer to Stigler (1939), Jones and Ostroy (1984),
Vives (1989), and Boyer and Moreaux (1989).
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Investing into a technology with a greater α reduces uncertainty on the produc-
tivity shock and makes it less crucial to keep flexibility. The incentive compatibility
constraint (32) comes “closer” to that found when the firm is myopic.
Before characterizing the optimal technology, observe that myopic parties would
never choose to make any such investment. Beyond that benchmark, we have:
Proposition 6 Assume that δ > 0 and d
dt
(ϕ(t) + tϕ′(t)) ≤ 0, for all t. Investing in a α-
technology which reduces uncertainty is optimal.
This result points a possible substitutability between contractual and technological
choices. When technologies are better able to cope with climate uncertainty, there is
certainly less need to distort intertemporal incentives with long-term contracts. Push-
ing further this idea, PPPs might then be viewed as more attractive than in our baseline
scenario.
8 Discussion
The three key variables that affect contracting patterns in our analysis are the distribu-
tion of the productivity shock θ, the discount factor δ, and the firm’s elasticity of effort
supply ε(t). One may wonder first how these variables relate to standard contracting
features and, second, how they might also depend on various institutional constraints,
such as financial restrictions, regulatory or political uncertainty, etc.
We may assimilate an increase in δ to a longer project duration, while tightened
financial constraints or increased uncertainty in the political environment may instead
reduce this variable. The distribution of productivity shocks may be considered as
more uncertain (in the sense of Section 7) when projects have a higher intrinsic expo-
sure to climate shocks and possibly more stringent ex ante obligations to cater to reg-
ulatory or environmental issues. Finally, as far as the elasticity of effort supply is con-
cerned, we observed earlier that ε(t) is non-increasing if eψ′′(e)/ψ′(e) is non-decreasing
in e. This is more likely when ψ′′(e) is quickly increasing in e. Any regulatory policy
or financial constraint that makes it more costly to provide effort in this strong sense
might also correspond to such non-increasing supply elasticity.
Longer project duration or more exposure to adverse climate shocks both reduce
ζ(δ, γ). This exacerbates the value of keeping flexibility. On the contrary, stronger fi-
nancial constraints or greater political and regulatory uncertainty might push towards
more myopic behavior not only by reducing the discount factor but also because the
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elasticity of effort supply might become non-increasing which also favors decreasing
incentives.
It may be interesting to reflect upon the relevance of our conclusions along two di-
mensions. First, we may now give hints on the value of contracting in sectors in which
projects are commonly managed as PPPs, such as energy production or distribution,
water and sanitation networks, transport project, and local public goods. Second, we
may assess the performances of different forms of PPP contracts typically found in
practice, such as management contracts, concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT).
As for projects across sectors, local public goods are probably those for which the
concerns for commitment dominate those for flexibility. Instead, water and sanitation
networks, which typically are governed by longer term concessions and cumulate high
exposure to climate hazard, are projects with high demand for flexibility. Transport
projects and energy endeavors might fall in between. Power production projects, with
their important exposure to climatic shocks and strong mitigation requirements, are
probably closer to water networks. We expect the trade-off between commitment and
flexibility to be more favorable to flexibility in water and energy production PPPs than
for energy distribution, transport and other local public goods.
Looking now at different forms of PPP contracts, some of the contractual dimen-
sions that shift the power of incentives, including asset ownership and duration, can
be linked to the shape of the rewards schedule. As mentioned earlier, decreasing incen-
tives, i.e., a shift from high-powered incentives earlier on to low-powered incentives
later on, may correspond to PPP contracts contemplating the return of assets owner-
ship to the public sector at the end of the contracting period, such as Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT). On the contrary, concession or Build-Operate-Own (BOO) contracts,
which include the divestiture of assets to private operators at the end of the period,
would have increasing incentives over time.
Although other factors certainly play a role, the recent trend in water management
away from PPPs may indicate that local governments tend to shy away from contrac-
tual arrangements which induce growing rents to private operators. We thus conjec-
ture that the shift towards decreasing incentives as a result of growing climate-related
uncertainties is more likely for water and energy production PPPs than for energy dis-
tribution, transport and other local public goods. It may also translate into shorter
contracts with lower-powered incentives schemes, and as well as a lower propensity
to divest assets in the long run.
As a result, our work casts doubts on the benefits of bundling, i.e., of PPPs of any
form, in a context in which unbundling may be welfare improving, unless sufficient
scope for technological improvements exists, which is again less likely in the water
26
sector than in energy. In environments in which climate-related uncertainty has strong
bites, and for projects sharing the characteristics pointed out, the use of relatively short-
term contracts, such as service or management contracts, not to exceed 3 to 5 years,
may be preferred.
This paper’s conclusions thus superimpose to the costs and benefits of PPPs al-
ready identified in the existing literature (e.g., Engel et al., 2008), shifting the standard
trade-offs discussed there. Moreover, as discussed above, the impact is likely to differ
across types of projects and sectors. While this bears some resemblance to Iossa and
Martimort (2008) conclusion that in “fast-moving” sectors bundling might come at the
cost of added rigidity, the potential substitutability between organizational and tech-
nological choices means that climate change may be less of a strain for PPPs in sectors
with rapidly evolving characteristics.
9 Conclusion
Considering that climate change related hazards are especially relevant for infrastruc-
ture sectors, we have questioned how climate uncertainty might affect long-term con-
tractual relationships such as PPPs. Our main results were to show how the classical
underinvestment effect found with irreversible investments under uncertainty is mod-
ified by agency costs. The contractual response to those new agency costs of delegated
flexibility depends on properties of the firm’s effort supply. When the elasticity of effort
supply is non-increasing (resp. non-decreasing), optimal profiles of rewards are non-
increasing (resp. no-decreasing) over time. This suggests that ‘BOT’ or ‘BOO’ forms of
PPPs may be good proxies depends on fine details of cost functions. We conjectured
that such decreasing incentives are likely for water and energy production PPPs, and to
a lesser extent for energy distribution, transport and other local public goods, putting
some stress on the long-run viability of PPPs in these sectors.
Beyond, our analysis has shown that coping with climate uncertainty certainly re-
quires a careful analysis of the joint design of institutional, contractual and technolog-
ical constraints. Short-term contracts, unbundling of tasks, flexible technologies are all
tools that help reducing the new agency costs of delegated flexibility.
Our analysis leaves a number of important issues unsettled. Whether institutional,
contractual and technological choices are complements or substitutes in coping with
climate hazards is an important question that was only briefly touched upon above.38
In this respect, an open question is whether flexible technologies become more attrac-
38This theme echoes the important insights due to Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), and Athey and Schmutlzer (1995) in more general frameworks.
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tive when governments cannot easily commit to long-term contracts because of politi-
cal or fiscal pressures to renege on the agreements signed with the private sector.
Another important question that would deserve further thoughts is how financial
and regulatory constraints may impact investments and adoption of new technologies
in infrastructure sectors. Our paper indicates that a first effect would come from how
those constraints shape the cost of effort but the exact channels remain to be unveiled.
Making progresses on that front is clearly a relevant issue from a policy point of view,
especially in a context in which much hope is placed on the development of green
technologies to face mounting environmental challenges.
Our approach to the problem of delegated flexibility has been by and large norma-
tive. Of course, political agendas may push public decision-makers to adopt objective
which differ from an ideal scenario. Environmental policies and concerns for flexibil-
ity may be high on the agenda of politicians at the time of the inceptions of long-term
contracts but may fade later on. This suggests that it could be interesting to extent our
framework to account for evolving preferences of the government and possibly with
renegotiation of its objectives.
Finally, investments on long-lived assets in infrastructure sectors plays a key role in
fostering growth. Climate hazards might thus impact on growth rates not only directly
by putting long-lived assets at risk but also by affecting contracts and investments in
those sectors. Again, the full consequences of this intriguing channel between climate
and growth remain to be studied. We intend to explore some of those questions in
future research.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Observe that:



























Taking into account the definition of ζ (δ, γ) in (11), we first obtain:
∂ζ
∂γ
(δ, γ) = − 1
γ2(1 + δF (ζ(δ, γ)))
< 0. (A1)



















Using again (11), observe that:










Integrating by parts, we find:∫ ζ(δ,γ)
0





























which ends the proof.























≥ 0 (resp. ≤) if ε(·) is non-decreasing (resp.
non-increasing).
Proof of Proposition 2. Observe that ϕ′ > 0 implies that ϕ(θt)
ϕ(ζ(δ,1)t)
− 1 > 0 for θ > ζ(δ, 1)




















f(θ)dθ ≥ 0 (resp. ≤) ∀t. (A5)
Applying Lemma 2 for θ′ = ζ(δ, 1) yields:
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)⇒ (A4) holds. (A6)
The comparison bewteen ts(δ) and tˆ(δ) immediately follows.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Equipped with the definition of the first-period effort given in
(12), we can rewrite the principal’s intertemporal payoff as a function of (t2, γ) (instead
of (t1, t2)):

















We first compute the derivatives of V (t2, γ) with respect to γ and t2 respectively:
∂V
∂γ





















(t2, γ) = −1
γ























Assuming quasi-concavity of V (t2, γ), the first-order condition ∂V∂t2 (t2, γ) = 0 defines
implicitly an optimal reward in terms of γ, say t∗2(γ). The optimality condition with





By definition of the optimal stationary contract ts(δ), we have ts(δ) = t∗2(1) since indeed,
fixing γ = 1, the optimality condition with respect to t2 amounts to:
∂V
∂t2
(ts(δ), 1) = 0,
which rewrites as (17).
Assuming that the principal’s objective is quasi-concave, the optimal value γ∗(δ)
satisfies the following condition:
γ∗(δ) ≥ 1⇔ ∂V
∂γ
(ts(δ), 1) ≥ 0.
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Evaluating the expression for ∂V
∂γ
(t2, γ) from (A8) at (t2, γ) = (ts(δ), 1), we get:
∂V
∂γ














Inserting the expression of S − ts(δ) taken from (17) into (A10), we obtain:
∂V
∂γ






















1 + δF (ζ(δ, 1))
. (A12)
Inserting (A12) into (A11), yields:
∂V
∂γ











In particular, we get:
∂V
∂γ









From (A6), we finally get:
ε(·) non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)⇒ ∂V
∂γ
(ts(δ), 1) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0).









(A13) can be simplified as:
∂V
∂γ
(ts(δ), 1) = 0.
This ends the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Observe that ζ(δ, γ) is decreasing in γ. Therefore, γ∗(δ) ≥ 1
implies
γ∗(δ) ≥ 1⇔ ζ(δ, γ∗(δ)) ≤ ζ(δ, 1).
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Taken with Proposition 3, this ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under unbundling, we can express the principal’s intertempo-
ral payoff as:












































Observe that the principal’s intertemporal payoffs under bundling and unbundling are
respectively such that:

























∗)/γ∗ where t∗2 is the optimal second-period reward and γ∗ the optimal ra-
tio between first- and second-period reward under bundling satisfy those properties).
Observe then that V (t2, γ, ζ) is everywhere non-decreasing in ζ . Therefore, we get:
V (t2, γ) ≤ V s(t2, γ).
Hence,
V (t∗2, γ
∗) ≤ V s(t∗2, γ∗)
and unbundling dominates.
Proof of Proposition 5. Observe that (27) implies that θ∗(e1) is such that θ∗(e1)t(θ∗(e1)) =
t1 and that θt2(θ) = ψ′(e1) = t1 when the technological constraint is binding. With those
observations, we can now write the principal’s intertemporal payoff under short-term
36
contracting in terms of the first-period reward t1 only as:
V st(t1) = (S−t1)ϕ (t1)+δ
(∫ θ∗(ϕ(t1))
0




























1 + δF (θ∗(ϕ(tst1 ))
)




By definition of t∗(θ∗(ϕ(tst1 ))), we have:









Because θ∗(ϕ(tst1 ))t∗(θ∗(ϕ(tst1 ))) = tst1 , it follows that:












1 + δF (θ∗(ϕ(tst1 ))
. (A18)
Comparing (A12) with (A18) gives us:
ζ (δ, 1) = θ∗(ϕ(tst1 )).
Inserting into (A17), we finally obtain (28).
Proof of Lemma 3. Differentiating (33) with respect to α, we get:
∂ζ
∂α






1 + δF (ζ(δ, 1, α)|α) < 0, (A19)
where the inequality follows from (31). This immediately implies (34).
37
Proof of Proposition 6. Making explicit the dependence on α, we rewrite the princi-
pal’s intertemporal payoff as
V (t, α) = (1 + δ)(S − t)Φ(t, δ, α)− C(α), (A20)
where the average discounted probability of success is now




ϕ(ζ(δ, 1, α)t) + δ
∫ θ¯
0
θϕ(max{θ, ζ(δ, 1, α)}t)f(θ|α)dθ
)
. (A21)
The first-order optimality condition immediately yields the by-now standard expres-
sion of the stationary transfer ts(δ):






The first-order optimality condition for the optimal investment level α∗ writes as:
C ′(α∗) = (1 + δ)(S − ts(δ))∂Φ
∂α





(ts(δ), δ, α∗) =
∂ζ
∂α










θϕ(max{θ, ζ(δ, 1, α∗)}ts(δ))∂f
∂α
(θ|α∗)dθ. (A24)
Integrating by parts, we get:∫ ζ(δ,1,α∗)
0








θf(θ|α∗)dθ = ζ(δ, 1, α∗)(1 + δF (ζ(δ, 1, α∗)|α∗)).






































































Integrating by parts and taking into account that
∫ θ¯
0
(θ − ζ(δ, 1, α∗)) ∂f
∂α


















(θ − ζ(δ, 1, α∗))∂f
∂α
(θ|α∗)dθ. (A27)











v(θ) = θ(ϕ(θts(δ))−ϕ(ζ(δ, 1, α∗)ts(δ)))− (θ−ζ(δ, 1, α∗))ts(δ)ζ(δ, 1, α∗)ϕ′(ζ(δ, 1, α∗)ts(δ)).
Observe that
v(ζ(δ, 1, α∗)) = v′(ζ(δ, 1, α∗)) = 0
and
v′′(θ) = ts(δ)(2ϕ′(θts(δ)) + θts(δ)ϕ′′(θts(δ))) ≤ 0
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under the assumption of Proposition 6.





















(θ′|α∗)dθ′ > 0 for all θ > 0
under (31) and v′′ ≤ 0. Finally, inserting into (A23) yields α∗ > 0 when δ > 0.
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